Introduction
A notion of attribute-based encryption (ABE) was first proposed by Sahai and Waters [17] , in which, a message m is encrypted to a ciphertext c under some predicate f , and a user with credential X can decrypt the ciphertext c if and only if the predicate f is satisfied by the user's credential X: f (X) = 1. The concept of ABE was further clarified by Goyal, Pandey, Sahai, and Waters [8] . They proposed two complementary forms of ABE: Key-Policy ABE and Ciphertext-Policy ABE. In this paper, we focus on Ciphertext-Policy ABE, in which attributes are used to describe users' credentials and formulas over these attributes are attached to the ciphertext by the encrypting party.
The first construction of Ciphertext-Policy ABE was given by Bethencourt, Sahai, and Waters [4] . Its security is proved under the generic bilinear group with random oracle model. (We call the model which uses both the generic bilinear group and random oracle the generic bilinear group with random oracle model.) Following [4] , many efforts have been done to improve the proof of security. Waters [20] gives a construction of ABE which can be proved under the standard model in a selective manner. Lewko, Okamoto, Sahai, Takashima, and Waters [13] and Okamoto and Takashima [15] give fully secure constructions of ABE in the standard model.
On a while, ABE has been applied in building a variety of secure systems [16, 19, 5, 1, 11] . One of major problems in these applications is that ABE-based systems tend to lack flexibility. A ciphertext once produced under decryption policy f never can be decrypted under a more loosened policy or(f, ∆f ) (if f is not satisfied) by the definition of security of ABE (of course). However, in reality, the degree of privacy of information is never fixed: yesterday's secret is not necessary secret of today. Even if some information is very restrictive (described as policy f ) to be accessed at this moment of time, the same information gradually can be made more and more accessible (described as policy or(f, ∆f )) as time goes by.
Our contribution. In this paper, we propose a notion of flexible attribute-based encryption. Flexible attribute-based encryption is a variant of ciphertext-policy ABE, which allows one to loosen a decryption policy underlying a given ciphertext, if one knows some system-wide trapdoor information, without knowing its underlying plaintext message. More precisely, suppose a given ciphertext c was generated by encrypting a plaintext m under a decryption policy f . The flexible attributebased encryption enables a "loosening operation" that, given ∆f and some system-wide trapdoor information γ, converts the ciphertext c into a more unrestrictive version of ciphertext c which encrypts the same plaintext m under the loosened policy or(f, ∆f ), without knowing the message m itself. Users having attributes that satisfy (only) the appended policy ∆f now can decrypt the ciphertext c to know the message m. Here we note that the trapdoor information γ is independent of individual policies or ciphertexts.
As one of applications of such flexible attribute-based encryption, we can consider an integration of cloud storage services. Suppose two storage services A and B are going to integrate into one storage service. Suppose, by policy mapping, that encrypted files C f A under policy f A in service A now should be decrypted also by entities satisfying policy f B in service B. The authenticated operator in service A with trapdoor γ can use the loosening operation against those C f A to get new encrypted files C or(f A ,f B ) that can be decrypted also by entities satisfying policy f B in service B.
We will see that there is a subtlety over security concerning such loosening operations and then we will define two notions of security of flexible attribute-based encryption, indistinguishability under loosening operation and indistinguishability under loosening key.
We also give a concrete construction of the flexible attribute-based encryption that satisfies the indistinguishability under loosening operation and the indistinguishability under loosening key, based on the construction of ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption given by Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters [4] . Its security proof is given in the generic bilinear group with random oracle model.
Related works.
The concept of our flexible attribute-based encryption is similar to the attributebased proxy re-encryption [9, 12, 10, 7] .
In the attribute-base proxy re-encryption, one can generate re-encryption key rk f 1 →f 2 , and by using the key rk f 1 →f 2 , a ciphertext c f 1 for policy f 1 can be re-encrypted into a ciphertext c f 2 for policy f 2 . To generate such re-encryption key rk f 1 →f 2 , the secret key sk f 1 for policy f 1 is required. On a while, in our flexible ABE, all ciphertexts can be "loosened" using the single (system-wide) trapdoor information γ (which is independent of individual policies).
The ABE scheme of [7] is more similar to our flexible attribute-based encryption in a sense. A user in the scheme of [7] can provide the proxy with a single transformation key that allows the proxy to translate any ABE ciphertext into a ElGamal-style ciphertext, that the user is able to decrypt under the user's secret key (with one simple exponentiation).
A Notion of Flexible Attribute-Based Encryption
A flexible attribute-based encryption scheme is a tuple of five PPT algorithms Setup, Enc, Ext, Dec and Loosen.
-(par, mk, lk) ← Setup(1 k ).
Algorithm Setup generates a public parameter par, a master secret mk and a trapdoor information lk for loosening, given a security parameter 1 k .
Algorithm Enc encrypts a given message m to a ciphertext c under a given decryption policy represented as a boolean formula f .
-(as, d) ← Ext(par, mk, as). Algorithm Ext generates a secret key d for a given attribute set as, using the master secret mk.
Algorithm Dec decrypts a ciphertext (f, c) by using a secret key d for an attribute set as to obtain a resulting plaintext m. The plaintext m may be a special symbol ⊥ indicating a decryption error if something is wrong.
By using the dedicated trapdoor information lk, algorithm Loosen loosens a decryption policy of a given ciphertext (f, c) so that more entities, that satisfy some added policy ∆f , can also decrypt the ciphertext c, resulting a new ciphertext (or(f, ∆f ), c ).
Correctness requirement. Under any valid setup information (par, mk, lk) (← Setup(1 k )), if one encrypts any message m ∈ Message(k) under any decryption policy f ∈ Policy(k) to a ciphertext (f, c), then it must be decrypted to the original plaintext m as
if the secret key (as, d) (← Ext(par, mk, as)) is generated for some attribute set as that satisfies the decryption policy f . If the ciphertext (f, c) is loosened by a policy ∆f to a new ciphertext (or(f, ∆f ), c ) as
then the resulting ciphertext c must be decrypted to the original plaintext m as
even if the attribute set as satisfies the appended policy ∆f (or f ).
Regarding security under loosening operations. Before defining security in a formal way, here we consider some aspects regarding security of such attribute-based encryption that gives loosening operations to users. First of all, the loosening operation should be performed by some entity with possession of the trapdoor information lk without knowing the underlying message. This will be captured in the security condition named 'indistinguishability under loosening key'.
Another point is a more subtle one. That scenario means that a victim's ciphertext c * can be corrupted even if c * itself has never been processed under loosening operations. (Off course, if the attribute-based encryption has CCAsecurity, that type of attack based on malleability can be avoided. However, at the same time we lose the loosening operations, too.)
We will require that loosening operations for c different from c * should never affect the security of c * , in the security condition named 'indistinguishability under loosening operation'.
Security of Flexible Attribute-Based Encryption
To define security of a flexible attribute encryption scheme, we describe games using the notation of the framework of code-based games [3] . In the framework, a game has an Initialize procedure, procedures to respond to adversary oracle queries, and a Finalize procedure. A game Game A is executed with an adversary A as follows. First, Initialize executes, and its outputs are the inputs to A. Then A executes, its oracle queries being answered by the corresponding procedures of Game A . When A terminates, its output becomes the input to the Finalize procedure. The output of the latter is called the output of the game, and we let y ← Game A denote the event that this game output takes value y.
Indistinguishability under Loosening Operation
Let FABE = (Setup, Enc, Ext, Dec, Loosen) be a flexible attribute encryption scheme. Let A be an arbitrary PPT adversary against FABE. In our game Game ind−lso A,FABE (k), procedures Initialize and Finalize are defined as follows.
-procedure Initialize: • assert(f * (as) = false)
• assert(f * (as) = false) for as's submitted to Extract-oracle.
•
In the above, "assert(f * (as) = false)" means that one must check whether the condition f * (as) = false holds or not if f * already defined, and abort if it does not hold, or else continue. Similar for "assert((f, c)!= (f * , c * ))". 
Indistinguishability under Loosening Key
Let FABE = (Setup, Enc, Ext, Dec, Loosen) be a flexible attribute encryption scheme. Let A be an arbitrary PPT adversary against FABE. In our game Game ind−lsk A,FABE (k), procedures Initialize and Finalize are defined as follows.
-procedure Initialize:
• b
Here, we note that Initialize returns a trapdoor information lk for loosening operation as well as parameter par (and adversaries A will know lk as well as par).
Procedure LR is used in Game ind−lsk A,FABE (k) to answer oracle queries from A:
Definition 2. A flexible attribute encryption scheme FABE is said to be indistinguishable under loosening key (IND-LSK) if for an arbitrary PPT adversary A its advantage Adv
We note that adversary A has no access to Extract-oracle in the game Game ind−lsk . Since A has loosening key lk, A can trivially decrypt the challenge ciphertext if A has access to Extract-oracle.
Concrete Scheme
We show a concrete flexible attribute encryption scheme. We start with a notion of linear-dependency resistant function, which is used as a building block for the scheme.
Linear-Dependency Resistant Function
Definition 3. A function F : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} 2N is said to be N -linear-dependency resistant if no PPT algorithm A is not able to generate n distinct strings x 1 , . . . , x n satisfying that F (x 1 ), . . . , F (x n ) are linearly dependent as vectors over Z 2 except with a negligible probability for any n ≤ N .
It is easy to see that statistically pseudorandom function F with range {0, 1} 2N is in fact Nlinear-dependency resistant. So, a hash function F : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} 2N is N -linear-dependency resistant in the random oracle model [2] with respect to F .
The FABE scheme
We construct a concrete flexible attribute encryption scheme based on the attribute encryption scheme of Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters [4] .
In the followings, Leaf(f ) denotes a number of leaf nodes of a given binary formula f . (ρ, M ) ← LSS(p, f ) denotes a transformation to convert a boolean formula f into a linear secret sharing scheme defined by a share-generating matrix M over prime p (with corresponding secret-restoring coefficients (ω i ) i ) with an assignment function ρ from the rows of matrix M to the universe of attributes. For its details we refer to [14] . Predicate IsDH(g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ) means the tuple (g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and
• Generate a bilinear group parameter (g, p, e) ← GenGrp(1 k ).
• Select a pseudorandom function
. */ -Enc (par, f, m):
• Convert the boolean formula f into a Linear Secret Sharing (LSS) scheme :
.n] , and c 5 = (c 0 , . . . , c 5 ) ).
-Ext (f, mk, as):
• Convert the boolean formula f into a LSS scheme : (ρ, M ) ← LSS(p, f ).
• Compute I = ρ −1 (as) and the corresponding secret-restoring coefficients {ω i } i∈I .
-Loosen (par, lk, (f, c), ∆f ):
• Loosen the policy f to f = or(f, ∆f ).
• Assert n := Leaf(f ) < N .
• Convert the boolean formula f into a LSS scheme : (H(i))) ) i∈ [1. .n ] and c 5 = (c 1 ) γ·F (f ,c 0 ,...,c 4 ) . = (f , c 0 , . . . , c 5 ).
The correctness of the FABE scheme can be verified in a straight-forward way.
Security of the FABE scheme
We can prove security of the FABE scheme, depending on the generic bilinear group with random oracle model [6, 18] .
Theorem 1. The FABE scheme with parameter N = N (k) is indistinguishable under loosening operation in the generic bilinear group model, under the assumption that the function F is (N + 1)-linear-dependency resistant, and in the constraint that encryptions are allowed only with respect to
"small" policies f that satisfy Leaf(f ) < N .
Theorem 2. The FABE scheme is indistinguishable under loosening key in the generic bilinear group model.
Thus, the scheme is both indistinguishable under loosening operation and indistinguishable under loosening key in the generic bilinear group (w.r.t. GenGrp) with random oracle (w.r.t. F ) model.
Proof of Theorems
Random encoding. Let Ψ 0 and Ψ 1 be two independent random encoding functions from Z p to {0, 1} 3log(p) with ranges G 0 and G 1 , respectively:
Let e be the pairing on
In what follows, we implicitly assume that an adversary A always has access to oracles for group operations in G 0 and G 1 and an oracle for pairing computation e.
Notation.
Suppose an adversary A is given some group elements {Ψ 0 (α i )} i=1,...,m in G 0 and {Ψ 1 (β j )} j=1,...,l in G 1 . (A does not know any of pre-images α i nor β j .) Here, we can assume no Ψ 0 (α i ) are redundant, that is any Ψ 0 (α i ) cannot be derived from other given elements as Ψ 0 (α i ) = k =i c k Ψ 0 (α k ) with known constants c k to adversary A. Similar for Ψ 1 (β j ).
Starting from the given elements
for any constants a i , b j known to A, by using the group-operation oracles, as well as elements
for any constants c i known to A by using the pairingcomputation oracle. Thus, if A is once given elements {Ψ 0 (α i )} i=1,...,m and {Ψ 1 (β i )} i=1,...,l , its possible maximum view View A can be described as a union of two vector spaces over Z p :
Here, we note that A is not able to sample elements in G 0 or G 1 by itself (except with a negligible probability) since those elements are encoded in a very redundant way into {0, 1} 3log(p) , which is exponentially larger than the size p of groups G 0 or G 1 . Moreover, by a standard argument in the generic group model, we see that the elements {Ψ 0 (α i )} i=1,...,m in Equation (3) To keep notation simple in View A , hereafter, we omit the explicit description of Ψ 1 -derived elements Ψ 1 (α s α t ) (from Ψ 0 (α i )'s by pairing computation) and merge Ψ 0 -elements and Ψ 1 -elements into a single space (even though sums of Ψ 0 -element and Ψ 1 -element are meaningless), so that View A of Equation (3) will be denoted as:
Proof of Theorem 1
Simulation. We simulate the game Game ind−lso A,FABE between an arbitrary adversary A and the proposed FABE scheme in the generic bilinear group model with the encoding functions Ψ 0 and Ψ 1 . First, A is invoked on a parameter par that is computed by procedure Initialize(1 k ). Then, A runs given oracle accesses to procedures Extract(·), LR(·, ·, ·) and Loosen(·, ·) under the constraints described in Game ind−lso A,FABE . Finally, A's output is given to procedure Finalize(·) to get a final result of the game. We need to show that the final result is equal to one only with a probability that is negligibly larger than one half.
The procedure Initialize is simulated honestly in accordance with Setup algorithm of the scheme as follows:
Given the output par, the (maximum) view of A is described as
The procedure Extract is also simulated honestly:
• Choose r (j) $ ← Z p and r (F (a) · γ) )) a∈as j , and d
Receiving the result of Extract(as j ), following pieces of information are added to the view of A:
The procedure Loosen is simulated honestly, too:
• Convert the boolean formula f into a LSS scheme :
/* Let dimension of M be n × l */ • Let gŝ = c 1 (we don't know the value ofŝ) and choose r 2 , . . . , r l
• Compute, using the key lk = γ, c 4 
The procedure LR is simulated as follows:
• Assert n * = Leaf(f * ) < N .
• Convert the boolean formula f * into a LSS scheme :
Analysis. The simulated LR procedure uses an independent fresh randomness θ to compute c * Proof. The difference between the simulated and real views is only that the simulated LR procedure uses an independent fresh randomness θ to compute c * 0 , but the real LR procedure uses αs * for that sake.
Under the generic bilinear-group model, distinct group elements are encoded in distinct independent random strings. So, to prove the lemma, it is sufficient that Ψ 1 (αs * ) never appear in the simulated A's view View A , provided that A submits no query to Loosen-oracle.
By the above observations, we know that the simulated view View A is described as
already before A submitting the query and A will receive the answer
Then we see that in order for A to obtain any information on the critical information 
already before A submitting the Loosen-query. Since elements (f (l) , c (l) ) in the query must not be equal to the target ciphertext (f * , c * ) by the rule of game, we have (f (l) , c 
Proof of Theorem 2
Simulation. We simulate the game Game ind−lsk A,FABE between an arbitrary adversary A and the proposed FABE scheme in the generic bilinear group model with the encoding functions Ψ 0 and Ψ 1 . First, A is invoked on a parameter par and a loosening key γ that are computed by procedure Initialize(1 k ). Then, A runs given oracle accesses to procedure LR(·, ·, ·) . Finally, A's output is given to procedure Finalize(·) to get a final result of the game. We need to show that the final result is equal to one only with a probability that is negligibly larger than one half.
The procedure Initialize(1 k ) and LR(·, ·, ·) are simulated in the same way as in the game Game ind−lso A,FABE , except that procedure Initialize(1 k ) now returns γ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ 2N ) as well as par.
Analysis. As in the proof of Theorem 1, all we need to show is that Ψ 1 (αs * ) never appear in the simulated A's view View A , which is described as 
Here, we note that (γ 1 , . . . , γ 2N ) are now known scalars to A. We emphasize it by giving them as indices of the right angle above, " γ 1 ,...,γ 2N ". By inspection of Equation (6), it is clear that View A does not contain Ψ 1 (αs * ). 2
